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Jerusalem. The characteristics of each settlement are detailed in the accompanying maps and charts.1
Since then the Begin government has "legalized" three settlements on the West Bank -Kaddum, Ofra, and Ma'ale Adumim -and has announced the establishment of several more outposts. The chairman of the Ministerial Settlement Committee, Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon, stated on the Israel radio on July 2 that "the government will first of all carry out the settlement plans that have already been decided" by the Labour government and will then initiate its own plans. Thus the Begin government emphasized that the settlements announced on August 17 were all within the scope of the previous government's programme. These settlements are located on the western and southern edges of the West Bank. Some thirty families and twelve singles moved into Yattir settlement, south of Yatta village, in early September. The international edition of the Jerusalem Post reported on August 30 that the settlers would initially live in a Jewish National Fund workers camp, replacing the Arabs who had been working in afforestation, and would later fence off some 17,000 dunums (4,250 acres) for pasture. The Post also reported that Reihana settlement, north west of Jenin, was now a functioning nahal and would eventually become a permanent civilian settlement. Sharon's twentyyear plan for two million Israeli settlers, while exaggerating the number of settlers available for and willing to move into the occupied territories, follows the general contours of the Labour government plan, namely (1) consolidating the strip along the Jordan River, (2) populating the western slopes of Samaria, and (3) widening the Jerusalem corridor.
The establishment of civilian settlements violates Article 49 of the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, which prohibits the transfer of the occupiers' population to the occupied territories. However, the Geneva Convention does permit security outposts to be built, and this rationale is used by the Israeli government to support what are initially paramilitary settlements but are rapidly transformed into civilian ones.
The number of settlers remains relatively small at most 10,000 aside from East Jerusalem, where some 10,300 family units have been constructed, accommodating 45-50,000 people. Nevertheless, the settlements raise fears among the Palestinian residents that the land will be alienated permanently and that they will be gradually squeezed out of the territories. The Palestinians have already suffered from large-scale land expropriation and the diversion of water resources, particularly in the Jordan Valley. Moreover 6500 Arabs have been evicted from the Jewish Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem, and about 10,000 bedouin were forcibly removed from a 160,000 dunum (40,000 acre) area in northern Sinai (Pithat Rafiah). The settlements represent substantial financial investments by government departments and the Jewish Agency. Millions of dollars have been invested in road networks, electricity lines, water pipelines, deep-bored wells, underground irrigation systems, and private and public housing. For example, Sadot (no. 13 [see map 3], northern Sinai) required an initial government /Jewish Agency investment of about $275,000 per family.3 Nearby Sufa (no. 11, northern Sinai) absorbed $2.5 million to construct the houses and prepare the land.4 And the basic infrastructure for Yamit town (no. 5, northern Sinai) cost $22.5 million, including $12.5 million to build and provide infrastructure for the first 350 families and another $625,000 to develop the beach.5
The timing of the establishment of settlements has been influenced by internal pressures and external opportunities and constraints. Immediately after the June War, some young Israelis went to the Golan Heights to found Merom Golan (no. 5, Golan), determined that the heights should remain Israeli.6 Children of the pre-1948 settlers at Kfar Etzion (no. 35, West Bank) persuaded the government to let them rebuild that settlement,7 and religious nationalists returned to Hebron (no. 36, West Bank) despite government reluctance to let them move into an Arab town.
The first government initiative came in the weeks after the war, when some 160 Arab houses adjoining the Western Wall in the Old City of Jerusalem were demolished, followed by the expropriation of about 600 buildings in the Jewish Quarter, so that they could be renovated or rebuilt for Israelis (no. 44, West Bank). The government then sponsored the establishment of a dozen agricultural settlements on the Golan Heights from 1967 to 1969, primarily located toward the south overlooking Lake Tiberias, to emphasize Israel's determination never to let the heights revert to Syrian control. In East Jerusalem, a northern chain of housing estates was begun in 1969-70 (Ramat Eshkol and French Hill, nos. 40 and 41, West Bank) , popularly dubbed the "Rogers Plan" housing, as their construction was accelerated in order to preempt any American pressure on Israel to leave East Jerusalem. The encirclement of East Jerusalem was completed by a southern chain of housing, begun in 1973.
Settlement drives in the Jordan Valley and northern Sinai (Pithat Rafiah) were undertaken in 1970 and 1971-72, respectively, after guerrilla raids across the Jordan River had abated and the armed resistance in the Gaza Strip had been crushed. In fact, the government decision to build the town of Yamit was taken in December 1972, several months after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat expelled the Soviet advisors and Israel felt that no effective diplomatic or military pressure could be exerted against its control of Sinai. After the October War, the construction of Yamit was halted and Nahal Sinai (no. 17, Sinai) was shifted from a site south-west of el-Arish to another site north-east of that Arab town . But the government decided in January 1975 to accelerate settlement in Pithat Rafiah,8 thereby signalling its intention to control the coastal zone from el-Arish to the Gaza Strip permanently. Moreover, the agricultural settlements in the Jordan Valley and Pithat Rafiah, which had an initial security function, soon proved highly profitable. Their winter vegetables, exported to Europe, brought in much-needed hard currency. Therefore settlement in these areas intensified in 1975, after a year's hiatus following the October War.
The correlation between settlements' timing and outside pressure was made clear on the Golan: On November 30, 1975 the government approved retroactively two "illegal" settlements there and initiated four new ones, as a retort to the United Nations Security Council for its acceding, the same day, to For detaila of aponaora, economic baaea and original ownera of the land on which aettlementa are placed, see Appendir 3 to this article. the Syrian terms for renewing the UN forces on the Golan, terms which included permitting the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the upcoming Security Council debate on Palestine.9
Israeli leaders have stressed the fundamental strategic role played by the settlements. In January 1977, the then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin declared that settlements increase Israel's security and provide a firm basis for its demand for peace with defensible borders. Moreover, he outlined the government's settlement priorities: strengthening the "confrontation lines" along the Golan and the Jordan and at Ophira (Sharm al-Sheikh, no. 22, Sinai), "bolstering" Jerusalem and the Hebron Hills (Gush Etzion), and ensuring a "blocking zone" south of the Gaza Strip (Pithat Rafiah). "There's a challenge here for all in the settlement movement who want to renew, expand and establish defensible borders for the State of Israel," he declared. 10
These priorities extend to all parts of the occupied territories except the central Sinai desert and the heavily populated northern West Bank. In fact, however, the militant religious group Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) has already pressured the government into permitting three settlements in the latter area, at Ofra (no. 28, West Bank), Camp Kaddum (no. 26, West Bank) and Mes'ha (no. 27, West Bank). Specific plans drawn up by government ministries and the Jewish Agency Settlement Department, whose nature or rate of implementation may well be altered by the new government, call for:
(1) The Golan Heights: The "gap" in settlements in the Central Golan will be closed, with Katzrin (no. 7, Golan) serving as the core town for eight industrial villages. Settlements may also be placed among the Druze villages, as has already been done with Har Odem (no. 3, Golan).
(2) Gaza Strip and Sinai: The settlements in the Gaza Strip will be linked to northern Sinai by a new coastal road, and their economic base may be strengthened by the introduction of glasshouse vegetable cultivation. Five more settlements will be constructed in Pithat Rafiah (northern Sinai) by 1980, all based on glasshouse agriculture,1" and Yamit will have 6000 residents. The establishment of an outpost at Kadesh Barnea (no. 19, Sinai), just south of the Negev border, may signal a move to widen Israel along the Gaza-Eilat axis. Moreover, the recent completion of a water pipeline to Ophira will enable that town to grow.
9 The Israeli decision also followed the November 21 guerrilla attack on Ramat Magshimim (no. 15), a Golan settlement located only 1.8 kilometers from the buffer zone with Syria.
10 Jerusalem Post, January 7, 1977 . 11 HaaretrZ, December 2, 1976 (3) East Jerusalem: According to the Jerusalem Outline Plan,12 no major construction will occur in West Jerusalem. All government-sponsored housing will rise in East Jerusalem: 18,000 housing units in the existing districts of Ramot (no. 39), Gilo (no. 42) and East Talpiot (no. 43) as well as in the area between French Hill and Neve Ya'akov (no. 38), thus linking that northernmost suburb with the other Jewish districts. Additional housing will partly link Neve Ya'akov to Ramot and will expand Atarot (no. 37). Thus the amount of Jewish housing in East Jerusalem will double and Israeli control will be solidified.
(4) West Bank: (a) Jordan Valley: The two tiers of settlements will be consolidated rapidly now that the road, electricity and water networks are in place.
(b) Southern sector (Judea): Gush Etzion will be expanded by at least two settlements and will be linked to Jerusalem via Gilo by a new highway. The Israel Lands Administration also wants to build a settlement at the southern edge of the West Bank -at Eshtamoa (near Es Samu village), five kilometers inside the West Bank -in order to "strengthen" the Arad-BeershebaDimona area.
(c) Northern sector (Samaria): By the 1980s a new highway will run from the Mediterranean coast via Latrun to Atarot, parallel to but north of the existing highway to West Jerusalem. Settlements will then be located along this route. 13 A chain of settlements may be formed on a north-south axis, five to eight kilometers inside the West Bank: Mevo Horon Gimmel and Mes'ha (27,29) are already located along this line. This chain would widen Israel along the coastal plain and foothills, but it would also place many Arab villages and the towns of Tulkarm and Qalqilya inside the Israeli zone. In the central hill areas, there are plans to construct a road from the coast via Akraba to the Jordan Valley, which would divide the Ramallah district from the Nablus district. And the five-year settlement plan calls for an outpost in the Dotan Valley, astride the Nablus-Jenin highway. These roads and settlements would split up and isolate the Arab populated areas.
The purpose of Israeli settlement policy is self-evident: settlements are designed to prevent territory from being returned to Arab rule. Whatever the long-term status of these settlements may be, in the short term they are likely to tie the government's hands in negotiations and to be perceived as a provocation by the Arab world. 
